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THE DEVELOPMENT OF WOMAN'S RIGHTS
IN THE LAW'
W. D. THOMPSON*

To the end that proper appreciation may be had of the great
advancement of woman in modem times in a social and material
way we should examine briefly into her status in the past.
One of the fundamental rules of human conduct impressed upon
the Jews as they were trekking back toward the Promised Land
was "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be
long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee."
When I say the land of their fathers, I think I make this statement advisedly. Recent excavations and research disclose that
the region we know as Syria and Palestine was inhabited by the
Semitic race thousands of years before the Israelites under Moses
and Joshua are said to have fled from Egypt to the land of
Canaan.
It has since developed that many of the characters described
by Milton in his first book of ParadiseLost as pagan gods were
kings and queens in ancient Syria and who were subsequently
deified and whose worship was subsequently impressed upon the
inhabitants of the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates upon the
conquest of that region by the Semitic race almost before the
dawn of history.
The point I wish to impress upon you is that from the beginning of recorded time down to the present day the Semites have
treated their women as substantially equal in all respects to men.
The biblical book of Esther is no doubt the reduction to literary
form of an ancient legend of Ishtar, one-time queen of Aleppo
in Syria, and Mordecai, who is substituted for Marduk, the
savior, and in fact the substitute for Christ, in the ancient Babylonian worship, embellished, however, to meet the conditions
existing contemporaneously with the writer of this book. The
fact that way back before the dawn of history the Semites
permitted a woman to rule over them at all is the significant fact
showing the respect in which womankind was held.
Another illustration is Semiramis, a queen and afterwards a
goddess of the ancient Assyrians; and Homer, in his account
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of the siege of Troy, tells us how Penthesilea, with a troop of
Amazons, came from their country somewhere in the region of
the Black Sea, to the assistance of old King Priam.
Experience has largely proven that many of the legends and
fairy tales have at least part of their foundation in fact, and it
would not be at all surprising if there did exist, somewhere in
the region of the Black Sea, in ancient times a country governed
by women, somewhat as the savage kingdom of Dahomey in
central Africa.
Among the ancient Greeks wisdom was deified in the person
of Minerva and the arts and sciences in the Muses.
The great majority of those who hear me are of the Germanic
race, which includes not only Germans, but the Scandinavian and
English races, and there is a very strong strain of Germanic
blood in both the Scotch and the Irish.
Gibbon, in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, treats
of the standing of womankind among the ancient Germans as
follows:
"The Germans treated their women with esteem and confidence,
consulted them on every occasion of importance, and fondly
believed, that in their breasts resided a sanctity and wisdom, more
than human. Some of these interpreters of fate, such as Velleda,
in the Batavian war, governed, in the name of the Deity, the
fiercest nations of Germany.-Tacit. Hist. iv. 61.65. The rest
of the sex, without being adored as goddesses, were respected as
the free and equal companions of soldiers, associated even by
the marriage ceremony to a life of toil, of danger, and of glory.
In their great invasions, the camps of the barbarians were filled
with a multitude of women, who remained firm and undaunted
amidst the sound of arms, the various forms of destruction, and
the honorable wounds of their sons and husbands. Fainting
armies of Germans have more than once been driven back upon
the enemy, by the generous despair of the women, who dreaded
death much less than servitude. If the day were irrecoverably
lost, they well knew how to deliver themselves and their children,
with their own hands, from an insulting victor."
"Heroines of such a cast may claim our admiration; but they
were most assuredly neither lovely, nor very susceptible of love.
Whilst they affected to emulate the stern virtues of man, they
must have resigned that attractive softness in which principally
consists the charm of woman. Conscious pride taught the German
females to suppress every tender emotion that stood in competition
with honor, and the first honor of the sex has ever been that of
chastity. The sentiments and conduct of these high-spirited
matrons may, at once, be considered as a cause, as an effect, and
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as a proof of the general character of the nation. Female
courage, however it may be raised by fanaticism, or confirmed by
habit, can be only a faint and imperfect imitation of the manly
valor that distinguishes the age or country in which it may be
found." Vol. I, p. 179, 18o.
The foregoing was notably illustrated in the war between Caesar
and Ariovistus, king of the Suevi, who, it will be remembered,
had not been under cover or under a roof for fourteen years.
These tawny barbarians had courage equal, if not greater than
the Romans, but lacked both the arms and the discipline. After
the men were all killed off, the women sent word that they
would surrender on condition that they be made slaves of the
Vestal Virgins. This was denied, with the result that practically
the entire forces of Ariovistus, numbering two hundred fifty
thousand men, women and children, were slaughtered, the final
slaughter being committed by the women of their children and
themselves.
In his description of the inhabitants of ancient Gaul, Caesar
relates that the bravest of these were the Belgians, horurn omnium
fortissimi sunt Belgae. These same Belgians had some centuries previous crossed the British Channel and colonized southeastern England. They made head against the mighty Caesar
and drove him out of Britain.
During the second invasion of Britain by the Romans, commencing about 44 A. D., it is related that Boadicea, the queen
of the Iceni, gathered together the warriors of the various tribes
and almost expelled the Romans from Britain, burning a great
many of the cities they had founded and slaughtering some
seventy thousand Romans and their allies before they were
finally overcome by Suetonius.
The Anglo-Saxons, being a branch of the Germanic race, no
doubt treated their women with the same kindness with which
Tacitus says the ancient Germans treated theirs. We are all
familiar with the story related in the Saxon Chronicle of King
Alfred being called down by the peasant woman for not watching
the cakes, while he was hiding from the Danes, who had subjugated his kingdom.
With the Norman Conquest came the feudal system, and it
would seem that with the feudal system came the subjection of
womankind to the domination and control of men, and this subj ection continued for about nine centuries.
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An unmarried woman, we may safely assume, had, and now
has the same property rights as men. Upon her marriage, however, here are some of the things that happened to her in the
good old days of Blackstone, who wrote of the laws of England
as they were in 1765.
"By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law;
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore
called in our law-French a Feme-covert, and her condition during
her marriage is called her coverture.***
"For this reason, a man cannot grant anything to his wife, or
enter into covenant with her; for the grant would be to suppose
her separate existence; and to covenant with her, would be only
to covenant with himself; and, therefore, it is also generally true,
that all compacts made between husband and wife, when single,
are voided by the intermarriage.***
"If the wife be indebted before marriage, the husband is bound
afterwards to pay the debt; for he has adopted her and her
circumstances together. If the wife be injured in her person or
her property, she can bring no action for redress without her
husband's concurrence, and in his name, as well as her own;
neither can she be sued, without making the husband a defendant.
"The husband also ('by the old law) might give his wife
moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her misbehavior,
the law thought it reasonable to entrust him with this power of
restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation
that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children; for
whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer."
Vol. I, p. 746-750.
A married woman was also incapable of making a will, or a
deed or other conveyance or transfer of land or personal property. She was a special ward of the court as well as of her husband, and the arm of the law seems to have extended to her
substantially the same protection as to idiots, persons of nonsane memory, infants and persons under duress. Crimes were
presumed to be under duress of the husband.
As one of the methods of acquiring property, Blackstone
recognizes the following:
"A sixth method of acquiring property in goods and chattels is
by marriage; whereby those chattels, which belonged formerly
to the wife, are by act of law vested in the husband, with the
same degree of property and with the same powers, as the wife,
when sole, had over them.
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"This depends entirely on the notion of an unity of person
between the husband and wife; it being held that they are one
person in law, so that the very being and existence of the woman
is suspended during the coverture, or entirely merged or
incorporated in that of the husband. And hence it follows, that
whatever personal property belonged to the wife, before marriage,
is by marriage absolutely vested in the husband." Vol. 2, p. 659.
Such being the situation following marriage, it is obvious that
women of property were very vigorously sought after and a
situation grew up which required the attention of the law-making
power. We quote again from Blackstone, as follows:
"The second offence, more immediately affecting the personal
security of individuals, relates to the female part of his majesty's
subjects; being that of their forcible abduction and marriage;
which is vulgarly called stealing an heiress. This was made
felony without benefit of clergy, which is taken away from all
such felons, who shall be principals, procurers, or accessories
before the fact." Vol. 4, P. 265.
The common law of England was imported into America by
the colonists from Great Britain and Ireland, also many of the
acts of Parliament enacted prior to the first permanent English
settlement at Jamestown in Virginia, A. D. 1607. The situation
was, like African slavery, so manifestly unjust that it became
intolerable, and the first half of the nineteenth century witnessed
the gradual emancipation of women in so far as property rights
are concerned.
In 185o, two years after Wisconsin became a state, our legislature passed an act known as the Married Woman's Property Act.
Chap. 44 Laws of 1850. Under this and subsequent amendments,
married women could own real estate of every description, and
the rents, income and profits therieof were not subject to the
disposal of the husband, but were her sole and separate property
as if she were unmarried.
By her marriage she did not confer upon her husband any
interest in her real estate or personal property, or in the rents,
issues or profits thereof. Neither her property nor its income was
or is subject to his debts, but she has the sole right of disposition.
A married woman, equally with a single woman, may receive
by inheritance or by gift or under a will from any person and
hold to her own separate use, and give away, sell or will away her
real estate and personal property, as well as that held in joint
tenancy with her husband. She has the same right of disposition
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of the income and profits from any such property. Not only that,
but since 1895 she could tranfer her property to her husband and
her husband could transfer his property to the wife.
A married woman is entitled to hbr own individual earnings,
except those accruing from labor performed for her husband or
in his employ or payable to him, and her earnings outside of
employment by or labor performed for her husband, are her
separate property not subject to her husband's control or liable
for his debts.
A married woman may also transact business in her own name,
in event her husband shall have deserted her, or shall, because of
drunkenness, proffigacy or any cause, neglect or refuse to provide
for her support or for the support and education of her children;
and her earnings derived from such business belong to her and
are not in any manner subject to her husband's control or
interference or liable for his debts.
A married woman may also sue in her own name and have
all the remedies of an unmarried woman in regard to her separate
property or business, and to recover the earnings secured to her
under the Wisconsin laws. She is also liable to suit in respect
of her separate property or business, and judgment may be
rendered against her and be enforced against her and her separate
property in all respects as if she were unmarried.
A married woman may maintain an action in her own name
and for her own benefit for the alienation and loss of the affection
and society of her husband, also for injuries to her person and
character, and any recovery belongs to her.
You will note the quotation from Blackstone to the effect that
the husband married not only the woman, but her debts, and
upon marriage became obligated therefor. It can very readily
be seen that under the old law the rich and unsophisticated youth
was as much liable to be overreached and mulcted of his property
and estate through debts of his wife, as the woman was to lose
her property upon marriage, to her husband. But the husband is
no longer liable for the payment of the wife's antenuptial debts;
but she shall be liable to all remedies for the recovery of such
debts to be enforced against her and her separate, property, as if
she were unmarried. There is no statute of limitations between
husband and wife.
Married women are likewise favored in the matter of insurance
upon the lives of others. She has the right to insure the life of
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her husband, son or other person, and have the loss payable to
her; "and any person, whether her husband or not, effecting any
insurance on his life or the life of another, may cause the same
to be made payable to or assign the policy to a married woman or
to any person in trust for her or her benefit; and every such
policy payable to or for the use and benefit of a married woman
shall be the sole and separate property of such married woman
and shall inure to her support, use and benefit, and that of her
children, and in case of her surviving the period or term of such
policy, the amount of the insurance shall be payable to her or her
trustee for her own use and benefit, free from control, disposition
or claims of her husband and of the person effecting or assigning
such insurance, and from the claims of their respective creditors."
She is thus protected under life insurance in an amount of which
$150 will pay the annual premiums. And with the consent of the
person making the policy, she may assign, encumber or otherwise
dispose of the insurance.
Any married woman of the age of eighteen years and upwards
may dispose of her property by last will and testament, and this
applies both to real estate and personal property. An unmarried
woman must have attained the age of twenty-one years.
The widow always had her dower in the lands of her deceased
husband, which formerly consisted of a life estate in one-third of
the land or real estate or the right to one-third of the net income
thereof. Since August 31, 1921, the widow's dower is a one-third
part of all the lands her husband owned during marriage, unless
she is lawfully barred of her dower. In case of the sale of the
homestead, the widow has one-third of the proceeds of the sale,
but she cannot have both dower and homestead rights at the
same time.
A non-resident married woman, on the other hand, is entitled
to dower only in the lands of her husband in Wisconsin which he
owned at the time of his death. This right of dower attaches
also in lands which have been exchanged, but the widow must
elect in which land, that is to say, whether the land originally
owned by her husband or the new land taken by him in exchange,
she will claim her dower, and this election must be made within
one year after the death of her husband. The right of dower
attaches to land which the husband may have mortgaged before
his marriage as against every person, except the mortgagee or
the one who owns the mortgage on the property. But dower
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does not attach to lands bought during the pendency of the
marriage relation, whereof a mortgage is given to secure purchase
money or part of the purchase price, but it does attach to any
surplus which may accrue above the mortgage on foreclosure and
to the entire property and interest therein, if the mortgage is paid.
Dower may be barred by an agreement called a jointure, which
must be made with the husband before marriage, and such jointure, that is, such setttlement upon the wife, must at least be a
life estate in some land or real estate to take effect immediately
upon the death of her husband.
Furthermore, the widow's right of dower is barred by a provision which may be made for her benefit in the will of her
husband, provided she elects to take under the will, or rather
she does not elect to take under the law. If she elects to take
under the law, the provisions for her in her husband's will are
void, but under the law she would be entitled to her dower right
in the real estate outside of the homestead, her homestead right
for life or until remarriage in the home, and to one-third of the
personal property.
The widow will be presumed to take under the will unless
within a year after the death of her husband she files in the
Cointy Court a notice in writing to the effect that she elects to
take the provisions made for her by law, in which event she will
be entitled to share in the estate of her deceased husband as above
stated and to the same extent as if he made no will at all, but died
intestate, as we term it. The homestead cannot be sold by an
executor without the consent of the widow, and in case of its
sale the widow is entitled to her one-third dower interest in the
net proceeds of the sale.
In this connection, we might add that the husband, on the death
of his wife, shall hold the lands of which she died seized or
possessed and which are not disposed of by her last will and
testament, for his life, as a tenant therof by the courtesy, provided that if the wife at her death shall leave issue by any former
husband, to whom the estate might descend, such issue shall take
the same, discharged from the right of the surviving husband to
hold the same as tenant by the courtesy, and this right of courtesy,
under the laws of

192,

which may accrue after August 31 of that

year, becomes extinguished upon the remarriage of the husband.
If the husband dies without leaving any will, his real estate under
the present law would descend one-third to the widow and the
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remainder to any child or children, - hether male or female, all
children sharing equally. If there be no child or children and no
will, the entire real estate descends to his widow; and if a woman
dies without leaving a will, leaving no children, her estate descends
to her surviving husband.
The homestead of a deceased husband descends free of all
judgments and claims against such deceased owner or his estate,
except mortgages lawfully executed thereon and except laborers'
and mechanics' liens, if he leave no children, to his widow. If he
leaves a widow and children, to his widow during her widowhood,
and upon her marriage or her death, to his heirs at law.
In this connection, we might observe that as to creditors, the
value of the homestead exemption is limited to $5,000 over and
above any mortgages that may be thereon, because the owners of
the home are presumed to have mortgaged the non-exempt part
thereof. But when we treat of the homestead, in the laws of
descent, there is no such limitation. If the homestead is worth
$Ioo,ooo, the widow taking under the law, has the right to the
use of the homestead for her natural life or until she shall
remarry. In event of sale of the homestead under mortgage
foreclosure, the widow is entitled absolutely to one-third of any
surplus remaining after payment of the mortgage debt, interest
and costs.
As to insurance which a married woman may have: She is
entitled to all moneys arising on any policy of insurance payable
to her, up to the amount of $5,000, if the person insured pays
the premium, but to any amount, if the premiums are paid by
some one else, where the insurance is taken out in some benefit
or fraternal organization. If taken in an old line company, the
amount of the insurance is limited, as before stated, to such sum
as may be purchased by $I5o annual premiums. The widow is
always entitled to any pension which may have accrued to her
deceased husband while employed in any department of the
government where pensions are allowed. But such amounts are
not assets in bankruptcy.
ALLOWANCES TO WIDOW BY COUNTY

COURT ON ADMINISTRA-

The County Court, which has jurisdiction of all matters relating to the estates of decedents, is
required by law to allow the widow certain property out of the
personal estate of her husband, whether disposed of by will or not.
Thus, the widow shall be allowed all her articles of apparel
TION OF HUSBAND'S ESTATE.
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and ornaments, also all wearing apparel, family pictures and
ornaments of the deceased, except such as may have been
specifically bequeathed by the deceased, also the household
furniture of the deceased, also all provisions and fuel on hand
provided for family use, also other personal property to be
selected by her, not exceeding in value $2oo. This allowance
shall be made whether the widow waives or accepts the provisions made for her in the will of her husband, or when no
provision is made for her, or in event the husband dies without
leaving any will.
The widow and minor children constituting the family of the
deceased husband shall have such reasonable allowance out of
the personal estate or the income of the real estate of the deceased
as the County Court shall judge necessary for their maintenance
during the progress of the settlement of the estate, but never for
a longer period than until their shares shall be assigned to them;
and, in case of an insolvent estate, not longer than one year after
the appointment of the executor in case of a will, or administrator,
if no will shall have been made. The court is also authorized to
assign the residue or remainder of the estate, after the payment
of funeral expenses and expenses of administration, to the widow,
for her support and that of the minor children, where the residue
or remainder does not exceed $i,ooo. If the residue exceeds
$i,ooo, all the excess or as much as is needed must be applied to
the payment of the husband's debts. All of the residue and
remainder in excess of the amount required to pay debts, funeral
expenses, expenses of administration, inheritance and income
taxes goes to the widow and children. Where there is only one
child, the widow gets a half. If there be more than one child, the
widow gets a third. Under the old law, the widow got only a
child's share, and, the more children she had the smaller her
share. This, however, has been corrected so that she gets at least
a third in any event. As before stated, if there are no children
and no will, the widow would get the entire estate.
Since the passage and adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment,
which provides: "The rights of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be abridged by the United States or by any state
on account of sex," our legislature passed a law which reads as
follows:
"i. Women shall have the same rights and privileges under
the law as men in the exercise of suffrage, freedom of contract,
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choice of residence for voting purposes, jury service, holding
office, holding and conveying property, care and custody of
children, and in all other respects. The various courts, executive
and judicial officials shall construe the statutes where the masculine gender is used to include the feminine gender, unless such
construction will deny to females the special protection and
privileges which they now enjoy for the general welfare. The
courts, executive and administrative officers shall make all
necessary rules and provisions to carry out the intent and purposes
of this statute."
"2. Any woman drawn to serve as a juror, upon her request
to the presiding judge or magistrate, before the commencement
of the trial or hearing, shall be excused from the panel or venire."
Section 6.05 Wisconsin Statutes of

1921.

The common law disability of a married woman to become a
surety for a third person is held by our Supreme Court not to
be a protection or privilege enjoyed for the general welfare, but
is a limitation upon her freedom of contract, not resting equally
upon men, and this limitation has been removed by Statutes 1921,
Section 6.015, and she may now make herself liable as a surety
to the same extent as a man could do under the same or similar
circumstances.
In speaking of the married women's property acts, our court,
in the case of First Wisconsin Natl. Bank vs. Jahn, 179 Wis. 117,
121, 127, per Rosenberry, J., said:
"It is argued that it is in the interest of the general welfare
that a married woman should not have the capacity to become a
surety for the debt of another. There is a sense, of course, in
which all legislation, at least all wise legislation, is in the interest
of the general welfare. The term is here used in a narrower and
more limited sense. The term 'general welfare' is used in this
section as referring to those statutes which are enacted in the
exercise of the police power and are intended to promote the
health, morals, and general well-being of the community at large.
There are many statutes relating mainly to hours of work, conditions of employment, sanitation, and other related subjects which
are enacted in the exercise of the police power for the purpose of
promoting the general welfare, and under and by virtue of which
it may be said as in Miller vs. Wilson, supra, that women enjoy
certain protection and are granted certain privileges. It is the
rights and privileges granted under this class of statutes to which
reference is made in the second clause of the section. No amount
of legislation, either statutory or constitutional, can destroy the
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fundamental differences of sex. All wise legislation at least must
recognize established indisputable biological facts. While there
is a continual reference in the earlier decisions to sex, drawn
from a time when social and legal distinctions were based largely
upon physical prowess, no one is now heard to contend that
because there are fundamental differences between the sexes
either sex is for that reason inferior or superior to the other.
By recent legislation in this country the sexes have been brought
to an absolute equality of right and privilege before the law, but
that fact does not and should not strike down sex as a basis of
classification in the enactment of laws relating to the health,
morals, and general well-being of our people.
"This statute, as are other statutes relieving married women
from disabilities incurred by marriage at common law, is remedial
in its nature and should be fairly and liberally construed to effect
the purpose intended. If experience pToves that it is unwise for
married women, in view of their actual situation, to be subject to
the importunities of their husbands and others in the matter of
the disposition of their property and the use of their separate
estates, no provision of the constitution will stand in the way of
the enactment of laws limiting her right of contract. This law,
broad and general though it is, does not exhaust legislative power
in this field. No doubt it is but the beginning of a legislative
program to effectuate in a broad and liberal way the more modem
conception of the place of women in the social, economic, and
political life of the country.
"We express and are called upon to express no opinion as to
-the wisdom of this legislation. As this court has said many times
over, that is a matter with which the courts have nothing to do
and one resting wholly in the discretion of the legislature. In
this case the appellant ma be deprived of a substantial part of
her separate estate in order that the debt of another may be paid.
She may receive no benefit or the benefits may be great. The
record discloses nothing but the bare fact that she became a
surety. This she had a right to do and she must endure the
consequences. It is natural that an effort should be made to
resist the application of the statute in a case where it may work
a hardship. With the consequences to her of the act of the
appellant we are not concerned, that being a matter which she
determined for herself when she endorsed the note. The law
should not be construed away in order to sustain preconceived
notions as to the wisdom of conferring upon married women
civil and political rights equal to those enjoyed by men.
"It is not even contended here that the legislation under consideration in any way violates any provision of the constitution.
It is clearly within the legislative field, and it is the duty of the
courts to so construe and apply it as to confer upon women,
including married women, all the rights and privileges under the
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law now enjoyed by men. No doubt some difficulty will be
encountered in the application of this statute to the law generally.
These difficulties, however, will not be insurmountable. In
practice they may prove to be not even formidable. The intent
of the legislature is clear and it is manifestly the duty of the
courts to effectuate that intention.
"We therefore conclude that the common-law disability of a
married woman to become a surety for a third person is not a
protection or privilege enjoyed for the general welfare, but is a
limitation upon her freedom of contract, not resting equally upon
men, and that that limitation has by the enactment of sec. 6.015,
Stats., been removed, and that she may, therefore, make herself
liable as a surety the same as a man could do under the same or
similar circumstances. The disabilities which occasioned the
interposition and protection of courts of equity no longer exist,
and the liabilities of a married woman, contractual or otherwise,
may be enforced as similar liabilities may be enforced against
men. She is therefore liable in an action at law."
I feel it is necessary to call attention to a great advancement
in the law relating to the custody of children. Under the old
law the father had the primary right to the custody of the minor
child, unless for some peculiar reason the court deemed it for the
best interests of the child to award its custody elsewhere.
This was changed in 1921, so both the father and mother, if
living together, and if living apart, then either, as the court may
determine for the best interests of the child, and in case of the
death of either parent, the survivor thereof, being themselves
respectively competent to transact their own business and not
otherwise unsuitable, shall be entitled to the custody of the
person of the child and the care of its education. If both father
and mother are incompetent or unsuitable, a third person
appointed by the court shall have the custody of the person, as
well as of the estate of the child, and the care of its education.
Under the present law both father and mother have the right
to appoint by will a guardian or guardians of the estate left to
any child.
In actions for divorce, it is the duty of the court to make such
provisions in its decree as it may deem just and proper concerning
the care, custody, maintenance and education of the minor
children of the parties, and give the care and custody of the
children of such marriage to one of the parties to the action, or
may, if the interest of the child demand it, and if the court find
that neither of the parents is a fit and proper person to have the

WOMAN'S RIGHTS IN THE LAW

care and custody of any such child, give the care and custody of
any such child to any fit and proper person who is a resident of
this state and willing to receive and properly care for such child,
or to an institution incorporated for such purpose. The court
likewise has power to change the care and custody of any child,
either by giving it to, or taking it from, such parent or other
person or such institution, on notice to the parents, and the court
may revise its judgment concerning the care, custody, maintenance
and education of the children or any of them and make a new
judgment in that behalf, as the circumstances of the parents and
the benefit of the children shall require. The court may likewise,
under its broad general powers, award the care and custody of
one or more children to one parent and of one or more children
to the other parent.
Inasmuch as the severance of the marriage tie by divorce
creates a condition somewhat analogous to that resulting from
the death of the husband, the law requires the court, upon every
divorce from the bonds of matrimony, for any cause excepting
that of adultery committed by the wife, and also upon every
divorce from bed and board, or limited divorce, to adjudge to
the wife such allowance out of the estate of the husband for her
support and maintenance and that of the minor children committed to her care and custody, as the court shall deem just and
reasonable, or the court may finally divide and distribute the
estate, both real and personal, of the husband, and so much of
the estate of the wife as shall have been derived from the husband,
between the parties, but no final division of the property shall
impair the power of the court in respect to revision or change of
allowances for the support of minor children.
When the estate is divided and the wife is given the care and
custody of all or any of the children, it is usually made the duty
of the wife to support the children awarded to her, but the law
goes farther and provides that when a divorce shall be adjudged
for a cause or fault committed by the wife and the care, custody
and maintenance of their minor children or any of them shall be
adjudged to the husband, the court may adjudge to the husband
out of the separate estate of the wife such sums for the support
and education of such minor children as it shall deem just and
reasonable, considering the ability of the parties and all the other
circumstances of the case.
Upon rendering a judgment nullifying a marriage or for a
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divorce, it is the duty of the court to restore to the wife any
of her property which may have been received or taken over by
the husband, and no judgment nullifying a marriage or for a
divorce of any kind shall in any way affect the right of the wife
to the possession and control of her property, except as may be
provided under the divorce laws of our state.
It goes without saying that in case of a judgment for divorce
from the bonds of matrimony, that is to say, dissolving the
marriage, the wife is not entitled to dower in any of the lands
of the husband nor to any right of homestead in the family home,
uinless expressly awarded to the wife by the court.
Where alimony is adjudged for the support of the wife and
children or either, in event of divorce, the law now requires such
alimony to be paid in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court
and to be paid over by the clerk to the party entitled. In event
of non-payment, it becomes the duty of the divorce counsel to
take the proper steps to enforce payment. In addition to this,
the parties may be compelled by the court to give security for
the payment of any alimony adjudged to be paid.
From the foregoing, it ought to be manifest to all that women
are endowed with a great many more rights than men. A married
woman can transfer her real estate without the husband's joining
in the conveyance. Not so the husband. Unless the wife signs
off, dower is not barred and the deed of a homestead without
the signature of the wife is absolutely void. The law has removed
all restrictions against contracting, and we might say, against
everything else which heretofore obtained for the supposed protection of women. But with the removal of these restrictions
arose practically all the liabilities which may be incurred by men.
You will bear in mind that under the old law a married woman
was absolutely incapacitated from contracting or obligating herself at all, except for the use and benefit or with reference to
her separate estate. If she signed or endorsed a note on behalf
of her husband and it was not for the benefit of her separate
estate, she was not liable. The law is different now. Our
Supreme Court holds that she is liable upon such a note, and
not only that, she is liable for all engagements she may enter into,
whether they have to do with her separate estate or not.
About the only discrimination I have found in the law against
married women is that provision of the state income tax law
requiring the wife's income to be assessed against and paid by
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the'lhusband. The tax is graduated, and where the income of
both is taxed together, it calls for a much higher rate than when
taxed separately and requires the wife to disclose to her husband
what her income is. It is not justifiable under any theory and it
is surprising that the injustice of a law which exempts $80o
income to a single person and only $I,2OO to a married couple
should be permitted to exist. The federal income tax law has no
such injustice.
I have heard and read quite a great deal, coming from women
agitators, to the effect that the female sex must be emancipated
from the control and domination of men. If anyone preaches
that doctrine to you, ask the spokesman in what respect women
are under such domination and in what particulars their liberty
may be broadened. From such survey as I have been able to
make, I must admit that I am unable to find any particular in
which women are inferior to men under the law. Widows get a
third of the deceased husbands estate notwithstanding he may
make a will to the contrary, whereas the wife may deed and will
away every dollar of her property from the husband and he has
no recourse. They not only have all the rights of men, but our
laws where the "masculine gender is used include the feminine,
unless such construction will deny to females the special protection
and privileges which they now enjoy for the general welfare."
Whether this will promote the welfare of our people remains
to be seen. In the order of nature certain duties and functions
devolve upon the male and other duties and functions upon the
female. Where civilization has advanced to the extent that the
natural functions of either sex cease to be properly performed,
the result is the decadence and final destruction of that particular
civilization. If the new order tends to change natural relations
and duties, it will be destructive. Such has been the result in
Egypt, Babylon, Greece and Rome, and historians and publicists
say that is what is happening to our race to-day.
(See also "The Property Rights of Married Women under Modern
Laws." By John B. Winslow in Marquette Law Review, Vol. I, p. 7."Woman's Rights in Wisconsin." By Mabel Search in Marquette Law
Review, Vol. 6, p. I64.-Ed.)

